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tions which are primarily pervaded by intimate social relationships"'
The external impact of exclusion from these organizations is largely
confined to exclusion of persons from sharing in these relationships,
traditionally a matter of only private concern.
It would appear, however, that the judicial trend with regard
to the problem of exclusion from membership is to view the facts
of each case individually, concentrating on the type of organization
and its purpose, the extent of control which it exercises and the
efffect on other individuals and the public.

Charles Blaine Myers, Jr.
31 K.ronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46
Cal. Rptr. 808 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905 (1966); Kurk v. Medical Soc'y,
260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ot. 1965). Note, Judicially Compelled Admm-iOfl to
Medical Societies, 75 HARV. L. REv. Il86 (1962}.

Statutes -Vagueness of Phrase "Contributing to
Delinquency of a Minor"
The defendant, Ralph Hodges, was convicted of contributing
to .the delinquency of a minor in the state of Oregon. He appealed

his conviction, contending that the statute under which he was
indicted violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Held, reversed and remanded. The statute was unconstitutionally vague and thus did not give, adequate notice of what conduct
was proscribed and consequently ·the judge and jury were allowed
so much leeway in its application that the law-making (legislative}
function was effectively delegated to them. State v. Hodges, 457 P.2d
491 (Ore. 1969).
The challenged section of the Oregon statute stated that "any
person who does any act which manifestly tends to cause any child
to become a delinquent child shall be punished upon conviction. .
."' "Delinquent child" is defined in a separate section· of the
'When. a child is a delinquent child as defined by any statute of th.ii;
state, any person responsible for, or by any act encouraging, r.ausing
or contributing to the delinquency of such a child, or any person who
by threats, command or peJSUasion, endeavors to induce any child to perform: any act ot follow any course of condU£t which would cause it to
become a delinquent child, or any person who does any act whkh
manifestly tends to cause any child to become a delinquent child,
shall be punished upon conviction by a fine of not more than $1,000,
or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding one
yea.r or both, or by miprisonment in the penitentiary for a period not
exceeding five years.
ORE REv, Sl'AT. § 167.210 (1967).
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statute as a person whose conduct or condition· is such as to fall
within the provisions of certain named paragraphs.•· The relevant
paragraph· used by the court in defining "delinquent child" states
that a child is delinquent if he is subject to the jurisdiction of the
junvenile court because his "behavior, condition or circumstances
are such as to endanger his own welfare or the welfare of others- .
. ."' By inserting this particular definition of "delinquent child"
into the contributing to the delinquency statute, the language
tested for vagueness as applied to the case then reads: "[O] r any
person who does any act which manifestly tends to cause any
child to become.... a child subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court because his ."behavior, condition .or circmnsta.nces are such
as to endanger his own welfare or the welfare of others ..."'
The majority of the court felt that the statute failed to place
persons on notice of the law's demands and lent itself to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judge and jury by
permitting the jury to. decide the meaning of the law. The law was
thus too vague to satisfy the requirements of due process of law and
was declared void. Although three judges specially concurred with
the majority decision, they did not concur on the question of the
constitutionality of the statute.• Judge Holman in his specially
• 'Child delinquency,' 'delinquent child,' 'child dependency' and 'dependent
child' mean a person under IS years of age whose conduct or condition is such as
to fall within the provisions of paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (1) of ORS
419.476." ORE. STAT. § 418.205 (1967).
(1) The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in any case
involving a person who is under 18 years of age and:
(a) Who has committed an · act which is a violation, or which if
done by an adult would constitute a violation, of a law or ordinance
of the United States or a state, county or city; or
(b) who is beyond the control of his parents, guardian or other person
having his custody; or
(c) Whose behavior, condition or circumstances are such as co endanger his own welf'acre or the welfare of others; or
(d) Who is dependent for care and support on a public or private
child-caring agency that needs t.lie services of the court in planning for
his best interests; or
(e) Either his parents or any other person having his custody have
abandoned him, failed to provide him with the support or education
required by law, subjected him to cruelty or depravity or failed to provide care, guidance and protection necessary for his physical, mental or
emotional well-being. • . .
On:. R.Ev. STAT. § 419.476 (1967).
• ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.476 (1) (c) (1967).
4 ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.210 (1967), ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.467
(1) (C) (1967).
• The indictment returned against the defendant charged that he exposed
and manipulated his private parts in the presence of a ten•year-old girl. The
specially concurring opinion reached the same conclusion as the majority because
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concurring opinion felt that there was no trap to the unwary or
undiscriminating citizen because of the alleged .vagueness with
which the conduct was described. He felt that the statute as constmed by previous cases• proscribed only those acts which were
commonly recognized by everyone as tending to produce delinquency. Therefore, Judge Holman argued that the statute was
constitutional because reasonable men would know what was prohibited.
If a law is so vague and indefinite that it leaves the public
uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits, and leaves judges and. jurors
free to decide what it prohibits, it fails to meet the requirements. of
due process.' It is a question of degree as to whether a statute will
be declared void on the grounds of vagueness, or whether it lends
itself to a construction limiting its application to an identifiable
factual situation. Many courts, including Oregon's have narrowed
the· construction of criminal statutes where the law was not found
void on its £ace.• This question of degree of vagueness varies according to the rigl?-ts involved and the nature of the statute. Where a
statute infringes on first amendment rights the test for vagueness
will be very strict and little effort will be made to save such a
statute by narrowing its application." When considering criminal
laws some vagueness can be tolerated if the laws do not trespass on
first amendment freedoms- The Constitution does not require imas a matter of law the judges felt that the actS done by the defendant were
not such as. would tend to cause delinquency in a. minor. State v. Hodges, 457 P.2d
491 (Ore. 1969) {specially concurimg opinion).
•State v. Casson, 223 Ore. 421, 354 P,2d 815 (1960); State v. Peebler, 200
Ore. 321, 265 P.2d 1081 (1954).
• See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
• E.g., United S,tates v. National Dairy ProductS Gorp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963);
Brockmuller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P .2d 992 (1959); State v. Barone, 124 So.2d
490 (Fla. 1960); State v. Casson, 223 Ore. 421, 354 P.2d 815 (1960),; State v.
Pee bier, 200 Ore. 321, 265 P .2d 1081 (1954) .
• See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v.· Alabama, 310
U.S. as (1940). The courts have felt that if a law is vague, and ilirst amendment
freedoms are involved, the vagueness could inhibit J?el'SODS from exercising
their constitutional rights for feair that _they might violate the statute. The
vagueness of the statute would therefore have a ·chilling effect on the exercise
of first amendment rights even though it does not actually prohibit these
rights. Where the vagueness of a statute does not irifringe on first amendment
rights the vagueness might inhibit some other lawful acts. The courts, however, balance the social utility of the acts that :might be inhibited against the
vagueness of .the statute in determimng whether they should move to protect
these rights. First amendment rights are alroost always protected by the courts
therefore little effort will be expended to save a statute by construing it narrowly
if it creates. a chilling effefct on these basic freedoim.
.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1970

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 4 [1970], Art. 9

430

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

possible _standards.. Lack of precision in criminal statu~es is not
in itself offensive to the requirements of due process. All that is
necessary is that the language convey a sufficiently definite warning
with regard to the proscribed conduct when. measured by common
understanding and practices.'•
In litigating the constitutionality of similar contributing-todelinquency statutes other states have reached a decision different
than Oregon's. In applying the test for vagueness these courts have
indicated that the scope of the subject forbids an exact definition
of what constitlites the crime. They have also considered the apparent impossibility of detailing all of the acts which could conceivably fall within the condemnation of the statute. The courts
have stated that the comm.on sense of the community, as well as
the sense of decency, propriety, and morality which most people
entertain, is sufficient to permit the statute to be applied on a case
by case basis."' Also, such statutes have a long history of common
law interpretation which renders much language sufficiently clear
and meaningful which might otherwise be vague and uncertain.
Because of this long history of interpretation, and the sense of propriety which people in a community entertain, the courts have held
the statutes sufficiently certain and definite to apprise men of
ordinary intelligence of the conduct prohibited by them.
West Virginia has a contributing delinquency statute similar
to Oregon's."' Unlike the Oregon statute, the crime in West Virginia
includes contributing to the "neglect" of any child, as well as to his
"delinquency". The section of the West Virginia statute similar to
that tested for vagueness in Oregon reads: "A person who oy any
act or omission contributes to, encourages or tends to cause the
delinquency or neglect of any child, shall be guility of a mis11

1•

"'See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); United States v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1 (1947).
11 See, e.g., Rrockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d
(1959); McDonald
v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1960); State v. Montalbo, 33 N.J. Supel',
462, llO A.2d 572 (1954) ; Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa, Super. 603, 1!13
A.2d 276 (1957) .
.,. See, e.g., State v. Millard, 18 Vt. 574, 46 Am. Dec. 170 (1845) .
,a E.g., :Srockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P .2d 992 (1959).
'* A person who by any act or omission contributes to, encourages or
tends to cause the delinquency or neglect of any child, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not to
exceed five hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail for a
period not exceeding one year, or both.
w. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 7, § 7 (Michie 1966) .

m
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demeanor.... "'" The terms delinquent child and neglected child
are also defined in the statute."' These definitions must be read in
conjunction with the contributing to delinquency statute to under·
stand what is prohibited. It is here that the question of vagueness
arises- Subsection (9) of the West Virginia statute defining "delin·
quent child" is similar to the section used by the Oregon court in
declaring their statute unconstitutional." It states that a delinquent
child is a person under eighteen years of age who " [d] eports himself so as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals or health of
himself or others/''" This definition when read with the contributing
to delinquency statute results in substantially the same words as
were declared vague by the Oregon court.
Subsection (7) of the West Virginia statute defining "delinquent child" seems even more susceptible to an argument of vagueness." It states that a delinquent child is a person under the age
of eighteen years who "[a]ssociates with immoral or vicious persons. . . .""' -The contributing to delinquency statute under this
definition would read: "A person who by any act or omission con"' Id.
'" "Delinquent child" means a person under the age of eighteen yean
who:
(1) Violates a law or municipal ordinance;
.
(2) Commits an, act which if COIDmitted by an adult would be a cnme
not pun:ishab1e by death or life imprisonment;
(3) Is incorrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond
the control of his pal'ent, guardian, or other custodian;
(4) Is habitually truant;
(5) Without just cause and without the consent of his parent, guardian, or other custodian, repeatedly deserts hi,; home or other place of
abode;
·
(6) Engages in an occupation which is in violation of law;
(7) Associates with immoral or vkious persons;
(8) Frequents a place the existence of which ill in violation of Jaw;
(9) Deports himself so as to wilfully injure or endanger the moral<! or
health of himself or others.
W. VA.. CoDE ch. 49, art. l, § 4 (Michie 1966).
''Neglected child" means a child under the age of eighteen, years who:
(1) Is destitute, homeless, or abandoned.
(2) Has not proper parental rare or guardianship.
(3). Habitually begs or receives alms.
(4) Ry reason of ·neglect, cruelty, or disrepute on the part 'of parents.
guardians, or other persons in whose care the child may be, is living
in an improper place.
(5) Is in an environment warranting the appaintment of a guardian
under this article.
w. VA. GoDE ch. 49, art. 1, § 3 (Michie 1966).
"W. VA. COUE ch. 49, art. 1, § 4 (9) (Michie 1966) .
is Id.
'"W. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 1, i 4(7) ~ichie 1966),

•ra.
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tributes to, encourages or tends to cause . . ." a child under the
age of eighteen years to associate "with immoral or vicious persons .
. .·.""The test for vagueness would be whether the meaning of an
"immoral or vicious person" is definite enough so that men of
ordinary intelligence would be apprised of the conduct prohibited
by the statute. ·
In determining the outcome of future attacks on the constitutionality of contributing to delinquency statutes, the test for vague•
ness must be applied separately in each situation. While it is true
that the statutes of some states, including West Virginia, contain
words or phrases that seem to be vague and indefinite, it is difficult
to determine how the test for vagueness will be applied by the various courts. The standards for determining vagueness where first
amendment freedoms are not violated seem as vague and indefinite
as the laws to which these standards might be applicable. It is therefore by no means certain whether the Hodges case will be followed
or whether the courts will narrow the construction of the existing
statutes and thereby save their constitutionality.
·

Steven C. Hanley

"'W. VA. CooE ¢. 49, art. 7, § 7 (Michie 1966);
(Michie 1966).

w. VA. Com: ch. 49, art. 1, § 4 ('1)
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